Ainda a luz – 2
Da luz e da visibilidade em Nietzsche e Blanchot. Ainda que o assunto seja a relação entre Heidegger e Blanchot, a dobra entre o visível e o invisível é um tema recorrente na filosofia francesa depois de Merleau-Ponty e outros. Então proponho uma série de referências à visibilidade, desde a filosofia grega até as últimas. Vamos ver se ao menos um projeto não fracassa.
Já se cansou de falar disso (Derrida, Blanchot, Foucault, Deleuze, etc.), mas eu repito: a fenomenologia, empreendimento radical por excelência – desde os primeiros motivos da obra de Husserl até o remix com o estruturalismo na obra de Derrida – carrega ainda em seus modos de formular os problemas uma herança ” oculocêntrica “, a história de um olho que reflete em seu âmago o todo do ser revelado, ao qual é destinada toda a amplitude do ser, por meio da mimesis da intuição e dos atos refletidos – em Husserl – seja na Origem da Obra de Arte de Heidegger, onde a obra é o lugar do combate entre céu e terra, imanência e transcendência, o chiaroscuro que é o ser razurado dos últimos escritos de Heidegger, o ser pervertido pela escrita. Essa é a opinião de Blanchot, ao menos. Mas checando as referências na literatura ” universal “, é difícil afirmar o contrário. Essa vai ser a série: citações dos lugares da literatura onde a luz tem um significado ontológico, onde a luz é fonte do sentido, sentido do ser e da verdade. Essas evidências são gritantes por toda a parte, acho.
“ Nietzsche recognized – this is the meaning of his untiring critique of Plato – that being is light, and he submitted the light of being to the labor of the most severe suspicion. A decisive moment in the destruction of metaphysics and, even more, of ontology. Light gives pure visibility to thought as its measure. To think is henceforth to see clearly, to stand in the light of evidency, to submit to the day that makes all things appear in the unity of a form; it is to make the world arise under the sky of light as the form of forms, always illuminated and judged by this sun that does not set. The sun is the overabundance of clear light that gives life, the fashioner that holds life only in the particularity of a form. The sun is the sovereign unity of light- it is good, the Good, the superior One that makes us respect as the sole true site of being all that is ‘above’. At first Nietzsche criticizes in ontology only its degeneration into metaphysics: the moment at which, in Plato, light becomes idea and makes of the idea the supremacy of the ideal. His first works – and there is a trace of his first preferences in nearly all his works – maintain the value of form, and in the face of an obscure Dionysian terror, the calm luminous dignity that protects us from the terrifying abyss. But just as Dionysus, in dispersing Apollo, becomes the unique force without unity in which everything divine holds back, so does Nietzsche little by little seek to free thought by referring it back to what does not allow itself to be understood either as clarity or as form. Such is finally the role of the Will to Power. It is not as power [pouvoir] that the will to power [puissance] imposes itself in principle, and it is not as a dominating violence that this force becomes what must be thought. But force escapes light: it is not something that would simply be deprived of light, an obscurity still aspiring to the light of the day. Scandal of scandals, it escapes every optical reference; and thus, while it may only act under the determination and within the limits of a form, form – an arrangement of structure – nevertheless always allows it to escape. Neither visible nor invisible. “
Maurice Blanchot, The Infinite Conversation, pg. 160.
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